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Abstract
We discover a consumption channel of monetary policy in a model with
money and government bonds. When the central bank withdraws government
bonds (short-term or long-term) through open market operations, it lowers re-
turns on bonds. The lower return has a direct negative impact on consumption
by households that hold bonds, and an indirect negative impact on consumption
by households that hold money. As a result, rms earn less prots from produc-
tion, which leads to higher unemployment. The existence of such a consumption
channel can help us understand the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy.
JEL classication: E24, E40, E50
We would like to thank Chris Edmond, Pedro Gomis-Porqueras, Susumu Imai, Benoit Julien,
Chao Gu, Tim Kam, Gordon Menzies, Guillaume Rocheteau, Je¤ Sheen, Chi Chung Siu, John
Wooders, Stephen Willamson, Randall Wright, Yajun Xiao and seminar participants at Deakin U.,
Monash U., RMIT, Tsinghua U., U. of Adelaide, U. of Melbourne, U. of New South Wales, U.
of Queensland, U. of Technology, Sydney, U. of Wisconsin-Madison, FRB of St. Louis, the 26th
Australian PhD Conference in Economics and Business, Sydney Macro Reading Group and 2014
Chicago Fed Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance for helpful suggestions
and comments. Dong acknowledges nancial support under Australian Research Councils DECRA
scheme (project number: DE120102589). Xiao acknowledges the hospitality and support during her
visits at U. of Wisconsin-Madison, FRB of St. Louis and U. of Melbourne during Jan., 2014 to June,
2015, and the funding support from Dan Searle Fellowships from August, 2015 to August, 2017.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Melbourne; Email: mei.dong@unimelb.edu.au.
zSchool of Economics, Auckland University of Technology; E-mail: sylvia.xiao@aut.ac.nz.
1
Key words: interest rate, monetary policy, consumption, unemployment
1 Introduction
We develop a model with money and government bonds to study how a change in the
supply of government bonds through open market operations (OMOs) a¤ects con-
sumption and unemployment through a consumption channel. Conventional mon-
etary policy generally targets some short-term interest rates by conducting OMOs.
During the recent Great Recession, targeted short-term interest rates in several ad-
vanced economies have been cut close to zero.1 This limits a central banks ability
to further lower the short-term interest rate to stimulate the economy. Instead of
targeting short-term interest rates, the central banks of the US, Japan and some Eu-
ropean countries all conducted unconventional monetary policy by either purchasing
long-term government bonds or other government-guaranteed private securities in -
nancial markets. The goal is to directly lower long-term interest rates in nancial
markets.
An important feature of conventional and unconventional monetary policy is that
they are essentially about adjusting the supply of government bonds through OMOs.
Hence, it is necessary for a model to have money and bonds in order to under-
stand the e¤ects of such policy. A few recent papers in monetary theory including
Williamson (2012) and Rocheteau et al. (2017) consider multiple assets, but most of
these models do not have unemployment. Given that one of the US Federal Reserves
mandated objectives is the achievement of "full employment," we integrate a labor
market model with genuine unemployment into a microfounded monetary model with
multiple assets.
1In 2008, the US Federal Reserve cut the Federal Fund Rate to zero. This zero-lower-bound
problem is also observed in Japan and various European countries. In Japan, as early as in 1995,
the Bank of Japan cut the short-term interest rate almost to zero, which lasted until 2016. After
the Great Recession, the European Central Bank cut the short-term target rate to zero.
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There are two key elements of our model. The rst is that money and bonds are
valued by households because they can facilitate transactions in the goods market.
The coexistence of money and bonds makes the model suitable to consider OMOs as
central banks swaps of government bonds and money. Monetary policy can a¤ect
householdsportfolio decisions if the policy changes the relative return of these assets.
The second key element is that the labor and goods markets are connected. Firms
bring production from the labor market for sale in the goods market. Households
can purchase goods for consumption in the goods market using money or government
bonds. This link between the labor and goods markets provides a channel through
which monetary policy a¤ects unemployment.
Our model builds on Berentsen et al. (2011). We rst add short-term government
bonds in addition to money. In such an environment, the central bank can adjust the
supply of short-term bonds as a monetary policy instrument, i.e., OMOs. We nd
that di¤erent cases of monetary equilibrium exist depending on the relative supply of
short-term bonds. OMOs can a¤ect the economy only when the supply of bonds is
scarce, but not too scarce. In this case, the return on bonds is higher than that on
money. Households that have access to bonds use only bonds to trade in the goods
market, and households that do not have access to bonds use money. When the
central bank reduces the supply of government bonds by purchasing bonds, the price
of bonds increases and the short-term interest rate decreases. For households that use
bonds, the lower interest rate directly induces them to hold fewer bonds and consume
less. As a result, rmsprots from selling to these households decrease. In the labor
market, lower prots discourage rms from entering and raise unemployment. In the
goods market, households face fewer trading opportunities and this will lower the
marginal benet of holding money. This general equilibrium e¤ect indirectly makes
households that use money hold less money and consume less, which further lowers
rmsprots and raises unemployment.
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We focus on the e¤ects of OMOs through a consumption channel. That is, the
change in the supply of bonds a¤ects the return on bonds and consumption by bond
holders in the goods market. This in turn can a¤ect labor market outcomes, which
further a¤ects the return from holding money. Therefore, real balances also respond
to OMOs. Our model provides a clear transmission channel of OMOs to the real side
of the macroeconomy. A permanent decrease in the supply of government bonds has
a negative impact on employment. The conventional view is that a central banks
purchase of government bonds would lower interest rates and thus stimulate invest-
ment. Our model does not have this investment channel. As this investment channel
has been identied in recent studies such as Rocheteau and Rodriguez-lopez (2014),
we argue that the consumption channel is complementary to the investment channel.
During the Great Recession, several central banks choose to purchase long-term
government bonds or other government-guaranteed private securities. To address
the e¤ects of this unconventional policy, we extend the basic model by adding long-
term government bonds. We consider the long run e¤ects of unconventional policy
where the central bank changes the supply of long-term government bonds. When
the short-term interest rate is close to zero, the central bank can buy or sell long-
term government bonds to directly adjust the long-term interest rate. Through the
consumption channel, unconventional policy lowers the long-term interest rate and
householdsconsumption. As a result, equilibrium unemployment increases. We nd
that a positive lower bound on the long-term interest rate exists because long-term
bonds are less liquid than short-term bonds.
We contribute to the monetary theory literature by providing a framework to
analyze how monetary policy especially OMOs a¤ects unemployment. We nd that
OMOs may not a¤ect consumption and unemployment when the supply of govern-
ment bonds is either too low or too high. When OMOs have a real e¤ect, the con-
sumption channel indicates that the central banks withdrawal of either short-term
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or long-term government bonds lowers consumption and raises unemployment. More-
over, there exists a positive lower bound on the long-term interest rate if a central
bank changes the supply of long-term bonds.
Our paper is related to two broad lines of literature. The rst line uses search
and matching theory to integrate the goods and labor markets. In Berentsen et
al. (2011) and Bethune et al. (2015), a medium of exchange is essential to facilitate
transactions in the goods market. Monetary policy is modeled as adjusting the growth
rate of money supply. These models provide implications on the e¤ects of monetary
policy on unemployment. We introduce government bonds so that we can consider
OMOs as an alternative monetary policy tool.
There is also a recent growing literature that studies the interaction between the
product and labor markets. For example, Kaplan and Menzio (2016) show how mul-
tiple equilibria arise when employed workers and unemployed workers have di¤erent
shopping patterns. They nd that high unemployment can be a self-fullling outcome.
See also Bai et al. (2017) and Hall (2017). Relative to this literature, we introduce
money and bonds into the product market in order to address how monetary policy
a¤ects the interaction between the goods and labor markets.
The second line of research involves microfounded models of assets and liquidity.
Williamson (2012) and Rocheteau et al. (2017) are most closely related to our paper.
Williamson (2012) develops a model with money, government bonds and private eq-
uity to study the e¤ects of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy. He
models unconventional monetary policy as purchasing private equity. Rocheteau et
al. (2017) focus on conventional OMOs and show how market structures and liquidity
properties of money and bonds matter for understanding the e¤ects of OMOs. See
also Mahmoudi (2013) and Williamson (2013) for more references. However, these
papers do not consider unemployment.
Rocheteau and Rodriguez-lopez (2014) build a model with an over-the-counter
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nancial market and a labor market. The model includes various types of assets
with di¤erent acceptability, i.e., money, government bonds and private assets, and
distinguishes public and private liquidity. The main result is that an increase in
public liquidity through a higher supply of real government bonds raises the real
interest rate, crowding out private liquidity and increasing unemployment. The main
theme is closely related to our paper, but they focus on the investment channel
of monetary policy by showing how monetary policy lowers the interest rate and
stimulates investment demand. Wen (2013) and Herrenbrueck (2013) develop models
to understand unconventional monetary policy. They calibrate to the US data and
nd that unconventional policy can e¤ectively stimulate investment under certain
conditions. In their models, there is no explicit unemployment because production
occurs in competitive markets.
Our paper is also related to the literature on market segmentation. Papers study-
ing OMOs from the perspective of limited participation of agents in the asset market
or transaction cost of transferring money between the assets market and goods mar-
ket include Alvarez et al. (2001, 2002, 2009), and Kahn (2006). Most of them use
CIA models, and they focus on the short-run e¤ects of OMOs. We abstract from any
short-run e¤ects of OMOs and focus on the long-run e¤ects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the models
environment. Section 3 introduces the basic model. Section 4 characterizes monetary
equilibria and analyzes the e¤ects of OMOs. Section 5 focuses on unconventional
monetary policy by extending the basic model to incorporate long-term government
bonds. We conclude in Section 6. Proofs and detailed derivations can be found in
the Appendix.
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2 Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. As in Berentsen et al. (2011), there are three
subperiods in each period: there is a search and matching labor market in the rst
subperiod; a decentralized goods market in the second subperiod; and a frictionless
centralized market in the last subperiod. We refer to these markets as labor, goods
and centralized markets hereafter. There are two types of agents: rms and house-
holds, indexed by f and h.2 The measure of households is 1, while the measure of
rms is arbitrarily large, but not all rms are active. In addition, there exists a gov-
ernment which is a consolidated scal and monetary authority. All government asset
transactions take place in the centralized market.
In the rst subperiod, unemployed households and vacant rms search and match
bilaterally to create a job. Let e = 1 if a household and a rm are matched, and
e = 0 if unmatched. Once matched, the match produces output y. The wage w is
determined by generalized Nash bargaining. The match may break up at an exogenous
rate . If unmatched, the household is unemployed, and will receive unemployment
benets, . Households receive w or  in the subsequent centralized market.
In the second subperiod, all households enter the goods market as buyers. The
utility from consuming q units of the goods is  (q), where  (0) = 0; 0 (0) =1 and
00 < 0 < 0. Only rms with output from the labor market are active as sellers while
those unmatched rms skip the goods market. For active rms, the cost of selling q
units of goods is c (q) in terms of y, where c (0) = 0, c0 > 0 and c00  0. Buyers and
sellers are matched randomly and bilaterally. The terms of trade are determined by
bargaining in all meetings.
In the goods market, the roles of households and rms create the double coinci-
dence problem. Since households cannot store any good, barter is impossible. Lack
2In our model, households are buyers in the goods market. We can also interpret households
as nancial investors who need to choose a portfolio of assets. See Rocheteau et al. (2017) for a
detailed discussion about di¤erent interpretations of households in a similar framework.
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of commitment and lack of record-keeping imply that pure credit is not viable in
the goods market. These frictions make assets essential as a medium of exchange to
facilitate trade. We assume that there are two permanent types of households, de-
pending on whether households can use bonds in the goods market. A fraction ! of
households can use only money, whom we label as type-1 households, i.e., h = 1. The
remaining fraction, 1   !; of households can use both money and bonds.3 We label
these households as type-2 households, i.e., h = 2. We can view type-2 households as
those who have access to nancial assets.
All agents can enter the centralized market in the last subperiod, where a nu-
meraire good x is produced and traded in this competitive market. We assume that
this numeraire good is nonstorable. A households utility from consuming x units
of the numeraire goods is x. If x is negative, it means that households produce x.
This linear utility makes householdsasset portfolios tractable. Firms with e = 1 sell
inventory (if c (q) < y ), rebalance asset portfolios and pay wages and dividends to
households.4 Firms with e = 0 can choose to create a new vacancy at a cost k. All
agents discount between the centralized market and the next labor market at rate .
The government is active only in the centralized market. In the benchmark model,
the government issues money and short-term government bonds. It can also adjust the
supply of short-term bonds through OMOs. LetMt be the money supply measured in
the beginning of the period t. The net growth rate of the money supply is . Short-
term bonds are one-period nominal bonds. Bonds that are issued at some discount
price in period t would pay 1 unit of money in period t+ 1. Let Bt be the supply of
bonds in period t. We focus on the steady states from now on, so we drop the time
3We model the liquidity di¤erence between money and bonds through their roles as a medium
of exchange. Money is more liquid than bonds as money can be used by all households, while only
type-2 households can use bonds. Alternatively, one can model the liquidity di¤erence between
money and bonds through their roles as collateral (See Rocheteau et al., 2017). In that way, short-
term bonds are less liquid as a collateral asset than money and long-term bonds are less liquid as a
collateral asset than short-term bonds. We use the rst interpretation in this paper for simplicity.
4As in Berentsen et al. (2011), we assume that rms are equally owned by households.
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subscript so that there is no confusion. It is useful to dene the nominal interest rate
of short-term bonds. From the Fisher equation, i is dened as 1 + i = (1 + )=. Let
is be the nominal interest rates of short-term bonds, 1 + is = m=s;where s is the
price of bonds in terms of x and m is the price of money in terms of x. As in Silveira
and Wright (2010), we dene the spread as the normalized nominal return di¤erence
between money and bonds. The spread of short-term bonds ss is
(1) ss =
i  is
1 + is
:
3 Model
The value functions for the labor, goods and centralized markets are U je , V
j
e , W
j
e ,
respectively, where j 2 f1; 2; fg and e 2 f0; 1g. We begin with the value functions
for households and rms in the centralized market, and then move to the following
labor and goods markets.
3.1 Households
A household entering the centralized market with type j 2 f1; 2g, employment status
e and a portfolio (m; bs), chooses x and the portfolio of money and bonds (m^; b^s) for
the next period,
W je (m; bs) = max
x;m^;b^s
n
x+ (1  e)+ U je (m^; b^s)
o
st. x+ mm^+ sb^s + T = ew + (1  e)+  + mm+ mbs;
where  is the value of leisure. The LHS of the budget constraint is total expenditure,
which includes the consumption of x, the value of money and bonds carried to next
period, and taxes T . The RHS is total income, which includes wage w or unemploy-
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ment benet , rmsdividends , and the value of money and bonds. Notice that
the value of bs in terms of x is mbs as 1 unit bond pays 1 unit money at maturity.
The value of b^s in terms of x is sb^s as new bonds are issued at the price s.
Substituting x from the budget constraint into the value function, we obtain
(2) W je (m; bs) = Ie + mm+ mbs + max
m^;b^s
n
 mm^  sb^s + U je (m^; b^s)
o
,
where Ie = ew+(1 e)(+)+ T . The envelop conditions give @W je (m; bs)=@m =
@W je (m; bs)=@bs = m. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), quasi-linear preferences in
the centralized market imply that W je is linear in (m; bs), and the choice of (m^; b^s) is
independent of (m; bs).
For a household in the following labor market,
U j1 (m^; b^s) = V
j
0 (m^; b^s) + (1  )V j1 (m^; b^s),
U j0 (m^; b^s) = hV
j
1 (m^; b^s) + (1  h)V j0 (m^; b^s),
where h is the endogenous job creation rate. Let (u; v) denote the measures of unem-
ployed households and vacancies. The matching function N (u; v) exhibits constant
returns scale. We have h = N (u; v)=u = N (1; ), where  = v=u is the labor market
tightness.
Moving to the goods market, households become buyers while rms with e = 1
become sellers. Each household is matched randomly with a rm. Given that the
measure of households is 1 and the measure of rms with e = 1 is 1 u, the matching
function isM (1; 1  u) ; which also has constant returns to scale. Recall that there
are two types of households. Type-1 households can use only money to trade. Their
value function is
V 1e (m^; b^s) = h
h
(q1) +W 1e (m^  d1; b^s)
i
+ (1  h)W 1e (m^; b^s),
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where h =M (1; 1  u) is the households probability of meeting a rm and (q1; d1)
are the terms of trade. That is, the household uses d1 units of money to exchange for
q1 units of goods. For type-2 households that can use both money and bonds, they
have
V 2e (m^; b^s) = h
h
(q2) +W 2e (m^  d2; b^s   s)
i
+ (1  h)W 2e (m^; b^s),
where (q2; d2; s) are the terms of trade. The household uses d2 units of money and
s units of short-term bonds to exchange for q2 units of goods.
Let S1 = (q1) m+d1 and S2 = (q2) m+(d2 +s) be the trading surplus for
type-1 and type-2 households, respectively. Here m+ refers to the value of money in
the following period. Using the linearity of W je , we can rewrite U
j
e for j 2 f1; 2g as
(3) U je (m^; b^s) = hS
j + m+(m^+ b^s) + EW je^ (0; 0);
where EW je^ (0; 0) is the expectation with respect to next periods employment status.
It is clear that @U je=@m^ and @U
j
e=@b^s do not depend on the employment status. We
then substitute (3) into the maximization problem of (2),
W je (m; bs) = Ie + m (m+ bs) + EW
j
e^ (0; 0)(4)
+ max
m^;b^s
n
 mm^  sb^s+
h
hS
j + m+(m^+ b^s)
io
:
From (4), the choice of (m^; b^s) is independent of e and (m; bs). Hence, households of
the same type take the same portfolio of money and bonds out of each centralized
market.
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3.2 Firms
Firms do not carry any money or bonds out of the centralized market since they would
not use it in the subsequent markets. For a matched rm with inventory , money
balances m and short-term bonds bs, its value function in the centralized market is
W f1 (;m; bs) =  + mm+ mbs   w + U f1 :
As rms do not carry any assets, we omit the state variables in U fe and V
f
e without
loss of generality. Depending on a rms employment status, the rms value function
in the following labor market is
U f1 = V
f
0 + (1  )V f1 ;
U f0 = fV
f
1 + (1  f )V f0 ;
where f = N (u; v)=v = N (1; )= , is the endogenous job lling rate. Only rms
with e = 1 produce y and participate in the subsequent goods market.
In the goods market, a rm may meet a type-1 household or a type-2 household.
The rms value function is
(5) V f1 = !V
f1
1 + (1  !)V f21 ;
where
V f11 = fW
f1
1 [y   c(q1); m+d1; 0] + (1  f )W f11 (y; 0; 0) ;
V f21 = fW
f2
1 [y   c(q2); m+d2; m+s] + (1  f )W f21 (y; 0; 0) :
Here f =M(1; 1 u)= (1  u) is the rms probability of trade. It costs a rm c (qj)
units of goods produced in the labor market to sell qj units of goods for j 2 f1; 2g.
12
The rm can carry the rest y c(qj) as inventory to the subsequent centralized market.
Using the linearity ofW f1 in (x;m; bs), we rewrite (5) as V
f
1 = y w+fSf+U f1 ;where
Sf = ! [m+d
1   c(q1)]+(1 !)[m+d2 +m+s c(q2)] is the rms expected surplus
from trading in the goods market.
The free entry condition in the centralized market implies that rms with e = 0
can choose to enter the centralized market by paying the entry cost k. Thus we have
W f0 = max
n
0; k + fV f1 + (1  f )V f0
o
;
where V f0 = W
f
0 = 0 in equilibrium. It follows that k = fV
f
1 . As in Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), we can derive
(6) k =
f (y   w + fSf )
1  (1  ) :
Recall that rms pay out prots as dividends in the centralized market. The aggregate
prot by all rms is (1   u)(y   w + fSf )   vk. For a household that owns shares
of all rms, the dividend income is  = (1  u)(y   w + fSf )  vk.
3.3 Government
The government is a consolidated scal and monetary authority. Without loss of
generality, suppose that the government has a balanced budget in every period. The
government budget constraint is
(7) m (M  M ) + sBs + T = G+ mBs  + u:
Here a subscript " " denotes variables associated with the previous period. The LHS
of (7) shows total revenue, which includes the value of newly issued money and bonds
plus tax revenue. The RHS represents total expenditure, which includes government
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purchases G, the value of previously issued government bonds and unemployment
benets.
The central bank can either adjust the growth rate of the money supply or the
relative supply of money and bonds. Let s denote the ratio of short-term govern-
ment bonds to money. The central bank commits to monetary policy where the
money supply grows at 1 + , and the ratio of short-term bonds to money is s.
Mathematically,
(8)
M
M 
= 1 +  and
Bs
M
= s.
By the Fisher equation, changing  is equivalent of changing i. We model OMOs
as changes in s. See also Williamson (2012) and Rocheteau et al. (2017) that
dene OMOs in a similar way. The interpretation of s is the steady-state ratio of
bonds supply held by the public (households in our model) to money supply. When
we consider a change in s, we essentially compare two steady states with di¤erent
values of s. For example, a decrease in s implies that the new steady state has a
lower supply of bonds because the money supply is determined by . Fewer bonds are
available for households to hold. We follow the arguments in Rocheteau et al. (2017)
to justify such a choice to model OMOs. Traditional OMOs where the central bank
decreases the supply of bonds are achieved through injection of money. We can allow
for such OMOs, but we implicitly assume that the change in money supply associated
with OMOs is sterilized by governments taxes T . That is, if OMOs inject money,
we can let taxes retire the newly injected money to ensure the growth rate of money
supply is 1 + . In this way, OMOs involve swaps of money and bonds, but we can
still consider changes in  and s as separate monetary policy parameters.
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4 Equilibrium
The terms of trade in three markets are determined as follows: agents are price takers
in the centralized market, and bargain over the terms of trade in the labor and goods
markets. In this section, we solve for equilibrium conditions in all markets and dene
a stationary monetary equilibrium. Then we use the model to analyze the e¤ects of
monetary policy.
4.1 Goods Market Equilibrium
A generic way to dene the bargaining solution is that for j 2 f1; 2g, a household
pays g(qj) in real terms to purchase qj units of goods, where g() depends on the
specic bargaining protocol.5 For example, the bargaining protocol could be Kalai
bargaining or generalized Nash bargaining. Let  denote the households bargaining
power. With Kalai bargaining, for the case dj = m^ and s = b^s, we have,
(9) g(qj) = m+(m^+ b^s  Ij) = (1  )(qj) + c(qj);
where Ij is an indicator, with I1 = 0 and I2 = 1. In case that either dj < m^ or
s < b^s, we have (9) and qj = q where q solves 0 (q) = c0 (q) :
For now, we use the general bargaining solution where the payment for exchanging
qj units of goods is g(qj). Note that another implicit constraint associated with the
bargaining problem is c (qj)  y. It means that a rms supply of qj is restricted by y
produced in the labor market. We assume that y is big enough so that this constraint
never binds.
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), the bargaining solution must be d1 = m^ and
q1 = g 1 (m+m^) for type-1 households. Given this, we move back to the centralized
5See Gu and Wright (2016) for a detailed discussion on various mechanisms determining the
terms of trade.
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market and solve for (m^; b^s) in (4) for type-1 households. The FOC with respect to
m^ yields
(10) i = h(u)(q1):
We use (qj) = 0(qj)=g0(qj)   1 to denote the liquidity premium in a meeting with
a type-j household. For type-2 households, they can use both money and bonds.
Notice that the return on bonds must be no lower than the return on money. When
is > 0, type-2 households would choose m^ = 0 and an interior solution for b^s solves
(11) ss = h(u)(q2):
When is = 0, we have ss = i = h(u)(q2), which we discuss in more detail later. In
(10), i is the marginal cost of spending 1 more unit of money for type-1 households,
while the RHS is the marginal benet of spending 1 more unit of money. Similarly, in
(11), ss is the marginal cost of spending 1 more unit of short-term bonds for type-2
households, while the RHS is the marginal benet of spending 1 more unit of short-
term bonds. For any u, (10) and (11) determine (q1; q2). The labor and goods markets
are linked: more unemployment reduces the number of rms entering into the goods
market and hence reduces the trading probability for households, which will further
a¤ect equilibrium (q1; q2).
4.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
In the labor market, wage is determined by generalized Nash bargaining. Let  be
the bargaining power of a rm. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we can
solve for
(12) w =
[1  (1  )](b+ ) + (1  )[1  (1     h)] (y + fSf )
1  (1  ) + (1  )h .
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Substituting (12) into (6), the free entry condition becomes
(13) k =
f (u) [y     + f (u)Sf ]
r +  + (1  )h(u) .
The ow condition in the labor market implies that (1   u) = N (u; v). This im-
plicitly denes v = v(u). The free entry condition determines u, given (q1; q2). This
establishes another link between the labor market and goods market. Compared with
the free entry condition in Berentsen et al. (2011), the rms expected trading surplus
Sf in (13) is the expected surplus from trading with two types of households.
4.3 Equilibrium Allocation
In any monetary equilibrium, is is endogenously determined given (i; s). The no-
arbitrage condition implies that is must not be lower than the nominal return of
money (i.e., 0). In addition, is cannot exceed i. Therefore, in equilibrium 0  is  i:
We now dene general equilibrium.
Denition 1 Given (i; s), a stationary monetary equilibrium is a list (q1; q2; is; u)
such that (i) given u,(q1; q2) solves (4), and is satises (1);(ii) given (q1; q2; is), u
satises (13); and (iii) asset markets clear.
Proposition 1 Stationary monetary equilibrium exists if k < (y      )= (r + )
and      1: The Friedman rule (i = 0) implements the e¢ cient allocation where
q1 = q2 = q and u is solved from (13).
The proof of existence follows Berentsen et al. (2011). If k is too high, entry
would be too costly for rms. Both the labor and goods markets will shut down.
Therefore, a monetary equilibrium does not exist. Notice that there always exists a
non-monetary equilibrium for any k. When a monetary equilibrium exists, it need
not be unique. In general, there might be multiple equilibria due to the strategic
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complementarity between rm entry and household portfolio decisions. If a monetary
equilibrium is not unique, we will focus on the equilibrium with the lowest u in the
following analysis. Under the Friedman rule, consumption in the goods market is
e¢ cient by using money. Bonds are not valued and is = 0. For i > 0, we have three
cases of monetary equilibrium depending on the values of (i; s).
When i > 0 and s is small, the equilibrium return on bonds is is = 0: In this
case, a scarce supply of bonds makes the price of bonds high. Money and bonds earn
the same nominal return, 0, and become perfect substitutes for type-2 households.
The economy is in a liquidity trap. From (10) and (11), q1 = q2 = q` is solved from
i = h(u)(q
`). The model reduces to Berentsen et al. (2011). This case with a
liquidity trap exists if and only if i > 0 and s  (1  !) =!.
When i > 0 and s is big, the equilibrium value of is can reach its upper limit
is = i. It is costless for households to hold bonds. Therefore, type-1 households are
willing to hold any amount of bonds and type-2 households hold bonds at least to
buy q in the goods market. In terms of allocation, q1 = q1p is solved from (10) and
q2 = q. This type of monetary equilibrium exists if and only if i > 0 and s  ;
where
(14)  =
(1  !) g(q)
!g(q1p)
:
That is, when s is big enough, the supply of bonds is abundant and the return on
bonds is high. We label this case as the plentiful bonds case.
When i > 0 and the value of s is neither too small nor too big, the equilibrium
return is is between 0 and i. The return on bonds is higher than that of money so that
type-2 households would prefer to hold only bonds. Meanwhile, the return on bonds
is not so high and type-2 households hold a nite amount of bonds. The aggregate
demand for bonds in real terms is (1  !)m+b^s = (1  !) g (q2), which equals the
18
supply of bonds in real terms m+B+. Type-1 households hold only money. The
aggregate demand for money in real terms is !m+m^ = !g (q1), which equals the
aggregate supply m+M+. Recall that B+=M+ = s. It implies that
(15)
(1  !) g (q2)
!g (q1)
= s:
The equilibrium allocation (q1; q2; is; u) is solved from (10), (11), (13), and (15). This
case exists if and only if i > 0 and (1  !) =! < s < . Compared to the case
with plentiful bonds, the supply of bonds is relatively scarce and the return on bonds
is low. Therefore, we label this case as the scarce bonds case. We summarize these
three cases of monetary equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For i > 0, three cases of monetary equilibrium exist: (1) the liquidity
trap case exists if and only if s  (1  !) =!; (2) the scarce bonds case exists if and
only if (1  !) =! < s < ; and (3) the plentiful bonds case exists if and only if
s  .
Figure 2 shows how the existence of these three cases of monetary equilibrium
depends on the values of (i; s). Notice that q1p decreases as i increases. It implies
that s is an increasing function of i. For i > 0, the economy is in a liquidity trap
when s is very small. As s increases and the supply of bonds increases, the economy
moves to the scarce bonds case, where the return on bonds is positive but still lower
than i. As s further increases and bonds become abundant, the return on bonds
reaches its upper limit i.
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Figure 1: Three cases of monetary equilibrium
Apart from (i; s) ; ! is also an important parameter that a¤ects the existence of
di¤erent equilibrium cases. A higher ! represents a bigger fraction of households that
use only money. It follows that (1  !) =! is smaller and the region for the liquidity
trap case will shrink. A higher ! also shifts down s (i). With fewer households
using bonds, it is more likely bonds become plentiful and the equilibrium reaches the
plentiful bonds case.
The central bank can adjust either i or s as its monetary policy parameter. We
nd that the e¤ects of ination are similar to the previous ndings in the literature.
A rise in i decreases households incentives to hold money and therefore reduces
consumption in the goods market. Firmsprots fall, which reduces their incentives to
enter into the labor market. Unemployment rises and we obtain a positive relationship
between ination and unemployment as in Berentsen et al. (2011).
It is more interesting to examine the e¤ects of adjusting the supply of bonds s.
Clearly, in both the liquidity trap case and the plentiful bonds case, changing s is
irrelevant because it does not a¤ect the allocation. Only in the scarce bonds case is
s relevant. Consider a decrease in s as an example. The central bank essentially
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decreases the supply of bonds to the public. This open market purchase of bonds
will drive up the price of bonds and lower the return on bonds. The nominal interest
rate is decreases. In response, type-2 households hold fewer bonds and consume less
q2. This reduction of liquidity in the goods market leads to a decrease in entry of
rms in the labor market. Unemployment rises, which implies a reduction of sellers
in the goods market. It follows that the return from holding money falls and type-1
households reduce their demand for real balances. Therefore, q1 also decreases and
this leads to a further rise in unemployment.
OMOs a¤ect the real side of the economy through the linkage between the goods
and labor markets. We label this channel as the consumption channel because the
central banks swap of money for bonds (or vice versa) a¤ects the return on bonds
and householdsconsumption. In our model, type-2 households hold bonds and their
consumption is directly a¤ected by the OMO. Changes in consumption by type-2
households in turn a¤ect labor market outcomes, which changes the return from
holding money in the goods market. Consumption by type-1 households is thus
indirectly a¤ected by the OMO. This will again inuence labor market outcomes. It
is important to note that the interaction between the goods and labor markets is the
key to understand the overall e¤ects of OMOs. Proposition 3 formally describes the
e¤ects of monetary policy.6
Proposition 3 Consider (i; s) as monetary policy parameters: (1) the liquidity trap
case: @q1=@i < 0; @q2=@i < 0; and @u=@i > 0; @q1=@s = @q2=@s = @u=@s = 0;
(2) the scarce bonds case: @q1=@i < 0; @q2=@i < 0; and @u=@i > 0; @q1=@s > 0;
@q2=@s > 0; and @u=@s < 0; and (3) the plentiful bonds case: @q1=@i < 0; @q2=@i =
0; and @u=@i > 0; @q1=@s = @q2=@s = @u=@s = 0:
6Notice that changing i or s can move the economy from one case to another case, as can be
seen from Figure 2. For example, when i rises, the equilibrium moves from the liquidity trap case
to the scarce bonds case and then to the plentiful bonds case. Our comparative statics results focus
on the e¤ects of changing i or s within in each case.
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In addition to the connection between the goods and labor markets, the other key
assumption for our result is that both money and bonds are valued by households,
but are not perfect substitutes. If money and bonds are perfect substitutes, then we
would have the results as in Wallace (1981) that OMOs are neutral. We assume that
two permanent types of households have access to di¤erent assets. In this way, money
and bonds di¤er in terms of their liquidity properties and returns. We need type-1
households to ensure money is always valued. We also need type-2 households so that
bonds are valued by some households. One can consider several other assumptions
about households. For example, we can assume that households are homogeneous
and can use bonds with some probability. There will be two types of meetings in the
goods market depending on whether a household uses bonds. We can alternatively
assume that households are homogeneous but can use bonds at a cost. This way
essentially endogenizes !.
We choose to have two permanent types of households for several reasons. The
rst is that this assumption of permanent types delivers sharp analytical results that
highlight the consumption channel of OMOs. While the consumption channel still
exists using the other two assumptions, neither way can provide clean analytical
results for the e¤ects of OMOs on unemployment. If households can use bonds with
some probability 1  !, the same decrease in s would lead to a fall in q2. However,
since households choose a portfolio of money and bonds before going to the goods
market, the lower return on bonds raises the relative benet of using money, which
makes households hold more money and q1 increase. The overall e¤ect of s on u
depends on the value of !. Our numerical example shows that a decrease in s
raises unemployment when ! is low, but reduces unemployment when ! is high. If
households can use bonds at a cost, there is an endogenous ! that makes households
indi¤erent between using bonds and money. In equilibrium, a fraction ! of households
use money and the rest use bonds. Since ! also depends on the value of s, it is less
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clear how s a¤ects consumption and unemployment, although our numerical example
shows that a lower s leads to a higher u. We feel that having permanent types of
households is the simplest model to deliver the consumption channel.
Another reason is that households in reality tend to be heterogeneous. As men-
tioned earlier, we view type-2 households as those who have access to nancial assets.
Schuh and Stavins (2015) nd that 91:3% of households in the US had a bank account
in 2013. Badarinza et al. (2016) document that 94% households in the US partici-
pate in asset markets using the 2010 wave of the US Survey of Consumer Finance.
These results are more likely to reect permanent di¤erences in households rather
than di¤erences caused by random shocks.
The last reason is more technical. If households are homogeneous and can use
bonds with some probability, the equilibrium of the liquidity trap case occurs only
when the supply of bonds is zero. When bonds earn the same return as money, all
households hold only money because bonds are not accepted in type-2 meetings. With
permanent types, even when bonds have the same return as money, type-2 households
are still indi¤erent between using money and bonds. Monetary equilibrium with a
liquidity trap exists in a larger set of the parameter space. See also Rocheteau et al.
(2017) for a discussion of the liquidity trap case using permanent types of agents.
5 Unconventional Monetary Policy
In the benchmark model, OMOs involve the central bank adjusting the supply of
short-term bonds. The recent Global Financial Crisis made a few central banks
including the US Federal Reserve purchased a large amount of long-term government
bonds. This type of monetary policy is labeled as unconventional monetary policy.
In the section, we incorporate long-term government bonds to address the e¤ects of
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unconventional monetary policy.7 These long-term bonds are perpetual bonds (like
Consols) that pay 1 unit of money in every future period.
The nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds i` and the spread s` are
dened as
(16) 1 + i` =
1 + `+=m+
`=m
and s` =
i  i`
1 + i`
;
where `=m represents the nominal value of long-term bonds. Type-1 households
can still use only money whereas type-2 households can use money and both types
of bonds in the goods market. When traded in the goods market, we assume that
long-term bonds are not as liquid as short-term bonds so that type-2 households
can use only a fraction  of their long-term bonds to buy goods.8 The central bank
can potentially change the relative supply of long-term bonds as its monetary policy
parameter. Suppose that the central bank commits to
(17)
B`
M
= `;
in addition to (8). Now monetary policy parameters include (i; s; `).
We discuss the main characterization of the extended model and leave details
about derivation in Appendix D. In the goods market, type-2 households can use any
assets. When solving the bargaining problem, an additional asset constraint `  b^`
exists, which reects that the household can use only a fraction  of long-term bonds
in transactions. Type-2 households consume q whenever any of the asset constraints
7Our model focuses on the steady state long run equilibrium. One may question that unconven-
tional monetary policy should be considered as short run stabilization policy. Given that the Fed
has implemented this type of unconventional monetary policy for more than 7 years and the Bank
of Japan has used similar policies for about two decades, it is useful to understand the long run
implications of such policies.
8See Nosal and Rocheteau (2013) and Rocheteau et al. (2015) for similar approaches to model
the liquidity di¤erence of di¤erent assets. See Li et. Rocheteau (2012) for more discussion on how
to endogenize the liquidity di¤erences.
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is not binding. If all asset constraints are binding, there is a FOC with respect to b^`,
(18) s` = h(u)(q2):
It is immediate from (11) and (18) that
(19)
s`
ss
=  or i` =
(1  ) i+ ( + i) is
1 + i+ (1  ) is :
For both short-term bonds and long-term bonds to be held by type-2 households, the
spread of long-term bonds must be lower than the spread of short-term bonds. That
is, long-term bonds must have a higher return than short-term bonds. This type of
positive term premium is also found in Williamson (2013) and Geromichalos et al.
(2013).
Proposition 1 still holds with the addition of long-term bonds. For i > 0, we
classify di¤erent cases of monetary equilibrium depending on the values of (s; `) as
follows. First, consider an extreme case where ` = 0. If the supply of long-term
bonds is 0, the model is essentially our benchmark model, where we have three cases
of monetary equilibrium depending on the value of s. In Figure 2, we draw di¤erent
cases of monetary equilibrium in the space of (s; `) for any given i > 0. The three
segments on the vertical axis represent the liquidity trap, scarce bonds and plentiful
bonds cases as s increases from 0 to innity. Next, consider the other extreme case
where ` = 0. If the supply of short-term bonds is 0, the economy resembles the
benchmark economy except that long-term bonds are not as liquid as short-term
bonds. Therefore, depending on the relative supply of long-term bonds, `, we have
three cases which we show on the horizontal axis in Figure 2. That is, when ` is
small, i` = 0 and we have the liquidity trap case. When ` is big, the supply of
long-term bonds is abundant so that i` = i. This is the plentiful bonds case. When
` is of intermediate value, we have the scarce bonds case and 0 < i` < i.
25
Figure 2: Equilibrium with long-term bonds
Finally, consider the case where s > 0 and ` > 0. There are again three
subcases. In Figure 2, area 1 shows the region where (s; `) is small. The returns
on the bonds are such that 0 = is < i` = (1  ) i= (1 + i) < i. Long-term bonds
o¤er a higher return, but type-2 households are indi¤erent between long-term bonds
and the other two types of assets because long-term bonds are less liquid. Area 2 in
Figure 2 illustrates the second subcase where the combination of (s; `) gives rise to
0 < is < i` < i. Type-2 households strictly prefer to hold bonds, but are indi¤erent
between the two types of bonds. When the supply of bonds is abundant as show in
area 3, both bonds yield high returns and 0 < is = i` = i. Here long-term bonds have
the same return as short-term bonds. Type-2 households are indi¤erent between the
two types of bonds because it is not costly to hold bonds.
A new case that is worth discussing is the equilibrium represented by area 2 in
Figure 2. It requires
(20)
s +  (1 + i)`
i (1  ) 
1  !
!
and s +
 (1 + i)`
i
 s (i) :
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Type-2 households hold a portfolio of short-term and long-term government bonds
to use in the goods market. Therefore, g (q2) = m+b^s + (m+ + `+) b^`. The
equilibrium conditions that characterize (q1; q2; ss; s`; u) are (10), (13), (18), (19) and
(21) g
 
q2

=

!s
1  ! +
!` (1 + i)
(1  !) (i  s`)

g
 
q1

;
where (21) is derived from the asset market clearing conditions. Short-term bonds
have a return premium because they are more liquid than long-term bonds.
Given that both is and i` are positive, the central bank can adjust either s or
` when conducting OMOs. In practice, it might be more common for central banks
to change s when is > 0. However, historical evidence documented by DAmico et
al. (2012) reveals that the Fed did long-term bonds transactions between 1942 and
1951, which could directly a¤ect the long-term interest rate. In addition, when is
is close to 0, it might be appealing to resort to unconventional policy to adjust i`.
Proposition 4 shows how conventional and unconventional policy a¤ects consumption
and unemployment.
Proposition 4 When (20) is satised, @q1=@s > 0; @q2=@s > 0; and @u=@s < 0;
and @q1=@` > 0; @q2=@` > 0; and @u=@` < 0.
The qualitative e¤ects of s and ` on (q1; q2; u) remain the same as before. When
the central bank decreases the supply of bonds, the nominal interest rate decreases.
The lower interest rate induces type-2 households to hold fewer bonds and cut back
consumption of q2. The decrease in q2 has a negative impact on employment in the
labor market, which indirectly reduces the trading opportunities of type-1 households
in the goods market. Through this general equilibrium e¤ect, type-1 households also
hold less money and consume less q1. As a result, employment further decreases. The
consumption channel may sound counter-intuitive, but the essence is that if monetary
policy changes returns on assets and assets are not perfect substitutes, it could a¤ect
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the portfolio choices by households and therefore a¤ect the macroeconomy. Such a
consumption channel exists only in models where households face non-trivial portfolio
choices.9
One interesting implication from the extended model is that there exists a positive
lower bound on the long-term interest rate. If the central bank keeps reducing the
supply of long-term bonds by lowering `, the equilibrium eventually moves from area
2 to area 1. Then the economy is in a liquidity trap where is = 0 and
i` =
(1  ) i
1 + i
:
Type-2 households are indi¤erent between money and both types of bonds. Notice
that long-term bonds still earn a positive interest rate because they are less liquid
than money and short-term bonds. This positive lower bound i` depends on the
ination rate and the liquidity of long-term bonds. A higher ination rate (high i) or
a lower liquidity (lower ) of long-term bonds leads to a higher bound.
6 Conclusion
We build models where money and bonds coexist to examine the e¤ects of monetary
policy on macroeconomic performance such as consumption and unemployment. In
the benchmark model with money and short-term government bonds, we nd that
a lower supply of government bonds can lower the short-term interest rate. The
lower interest rate induces households that use bonds to reduce their consumption.
Households that do not use bonds also lower their consumption through an indirect
9There is some empirical literature about the impacts of low interest rates during the Great
Recession on household consumption and unemployment, such as Mian et al. (2013), Mian and Su
(2014), and Keys et al. (2015). Particularly, Mian and Su (2014) show the housing net worth
channel played a signicant role in the sharp decline in the U.S. employment during 2007-2009.
Although our model does not have the exact "housing net worth channel", the empirical results
from Mian and Su (2014) still provide support for the link between household consumption and
employment. See also Maggio et al. (2015).
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general equilibrium e¤ect. The lower consumption by households reduces rmsprots
and leads to higher unemployment in the economy. We highlight that the e¤ects of
such OMOs are through a consumption channel. When the economys short-term
interest rate is close to zero, the central bank can resort to unconventional monetary
policy by adjusting the long-term interest rate. By purchasing long-term government
bonds, the long-term interest rate is lowered, which again leads to lower consumption
and higher unemployment.
When assessing the e¤ectiveness of unconventional monetary policy, it is more
common to focus on the investment channel where a lower interest rate could stimulate
investment demand and output. Our model uncovers a new channel that works
through consumption demand. In contrast to the e¤ects on investment, the lower
interest rate has negative e¤ects of consumption and employment. We view this
consumption channel as being complementary to the investment channel. It would
be useful to construct models where both the consumption channel and the investment
channel are present to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of unconventional monetary policy.
We leave this for future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
The equilibrium values of (q1; q2; ss; u) are determined by (10), (11), (15), and
(22) H (u) = !

g
 
q1
  c  q1+ (1  !) g  q2  c  q2 ;
where (22) is derived from (13) and
H (u) =
k [r +  + (1  )h (u)]  f (u) (y     )
f (u)f (u)
:
Since 0h (u) < 0, 
0
f (u) > 0 and 
0
f (u) > 0, we know that H
0 (u) < 0. We reduce
the equations system to two equations (10) and (22) to solve for (q1; u), where q2 is a
function of q1 through (15). Then q2 is derived from (15) and ss can be derived from
(11). Taking full derivation of (10) and (22), we have
@q1
@s
=
!0h1g1 (g
0
2   c02)
D
'  D;
@u
@s
=  !h
0
1g1 (g
0
2   c02)
D
' D;
where
D =  h01g02H 0   !0h1 [g02 (g01   c01) + sg01 (g02   c02)] :
If we graph (10) and (22) on the (u; q1) space, we know from (10)
dq1
du
=  
0
h1
h01
< 0:
It implies that (10) is downward sloping. Moreover, when u ! 0, q1 is derived from
i = h (1) (q
1), which should be a nite number. When q ! 0, u should approach
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1. From (22), we have
dq1
du
=
g02H
0
!g02 (g
0
1   c01) + !sg01 (g02   c02)
< 0;
which means that (22) is also downward sloping. Moreover, when u ! 0, H (u) ap-
proaches innity. It follows that q1 should approach innity as well. The intersection
of the two curves gives equilibrium (u; q1). If monetary equilibrium exists, there is
at least one solution at which (22) is steeper than (10). If monetary equilibrium is
unique or if we focus on the equilibrium with the smallest q1, then it must be true
that (22) is steeper than (10) at the equilibrium allocation. Mathematically,
 
0
h1
h01
>
g02H
0
!g02 (g
0
1   c01) + !sg01 (g02   c02)
:
After rearranging, this exactly implies that D < 0.
We use (15) to derive
@q2
@s
=  !g1 [h
0
1H
0 + !0h1 (g
0
1   c01)]
(1  !)D :
Notice that D < 0 implies that the h01H
0 + !0h1 (g
0
1   c01) > 0 and therefore we
obtain
@q1
@s
> 0;
@q2
@s
> 0; and
@u
@s
< 0:
From (11), we have
@ss
@s
=  !hg1 fh
0
1
0
2H
0 + 0h [!1
0
2 (g
0
1   c01) + (1  !)012 (g02   c02)]g
(1  !)D :
The sign of @ss=@s is not clear.
Recall that ss = (i  is) = (1 + is). It follows that @ss=@s '  @is=@s: An-
other way to see the sign of @is=@s is the following. From the equilibrium exis-
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tence condition, we know that for any i > 0, liquidity trap equilibrium exists when
s 2 [0; (1  !) =!] and plentiful bonds equilibrium exists when s 2 [s (i) ;1).
Also note that is = 0 when s = (1  !) =!, and is = i when s = s : When
s 2 [(1  !) =!; s ], the equilibrium is a scarce bonds equilibrium. From the equi-
librium conditions, we have is ! 0 when s ! (1  !) =! and is ! i when s ! s .
When monetary equilibrium is unique, there is one is for any given s. If it is also
true that there is one s for any given is, then we know that is (s) must be either
strictly increasing or strictly decreasing.
To prove that there is one s for any given is is equivalent to prove that the
solution (q1; q2; u) to (10), (24) and (22) is unique for any given is or ss. In general,
it is not guaranteed that there exists a unique solution. However, when the solution
is unique, we can argue that is (s) must be strictly monotonic. Given the values of
the end points, it is only possible that is (s) is a strictly increasing function. That is
@is
@s
> 0 and
@ss
@s
< 0:
When 0 = is < i` < i, the return on short-term bonds is 0. The return on long-
term bonds is positive. However, since long-term bonds are less liquid than short-
term bonds, it is not clear how type-2 households choose among money, short-term
bonds and long-term bonds. Recall that for both short-term bonds and long-term
bonds to be held by type-2 households, we have (19). When is = 0, i` must be
(1  ) i= (1 + i) so that type-2 households hold both types of bonds. It follows that
[1] when 0 = is < i` < (1  ) i= (1 + i), type-2 households would not hold long-term
bonds and monetary equilibrium is the same as the liquidity trap equilibrium in the
model without long-term bonds; and [2] when 0 = is < (1  ) i= (1 + i) < i` < i,
type-2 households hold only long-term bonds. In this case, short-term bonds and
money are dominated by long-term bonds for type-2 households. If the economy is
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in this equilibrium, the government cannot further lower is when conducting OMOs.
Instead, the government can rely on changing i` to a¤ect the economy. We argue that
this type of monetary policy resembles unconventional monetary policy conducted by
central banks in U.S. and other advanced economies.
To understand the e¤ects of changing `, we gather the equilibrium conditions
(10), (22), (18), and
(23) s` = i  !` (1 + i) g (q
1)
(1  !) g (q2) :
Here (23) is derived from (31). Substitute s` from (23) into (18),
(24) i  !` (1 + i) g (q
1)
(1  !) g (q2) = h (u)
 
q2

:
Now we use (10), (24) and (22) to solve for (q1; q2; u). Taking full derivation against
these three equations, we have
@q1
@`
=  !(1  !)(1 + i)
0
h1g1(g
0
2   c02)
D
' D;
@q2
@`
=
!(1 + i)g1[h
0
1H
0 + !0h1(g
0
1   c01)]
D
;
@u
@`
=
!(1  !)(1 + i)h01g1(g02   c02)
D
'  D;
where
D = (1  !) 0h (g02   c02) [!` (1 + i)1g01   (1  !)h012g2]
  (1  !) [h01H 0 + !0h1 (g01   c01)] [h (02g2 + 2g02)  ig02] :
To nd the sign of D, we adopt the approach used in the proof of the basic model.
Instead of three equations, we reduce the system to two equations (10) and (22) to
solve for (q1; u). From (10) and (18), we have s` = i2=1, which can be substituted
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into (23). In (22), we view q2 as a function of q1 solved from
(25) g
 
q2

=
!` (1 + i)1g1
(1  !) i (1   2) :
From (10), we have
dq1
du
=  
0
h1
h01
< 0:
It means that in the (u; q1) space, (10) is downward sloping. Moreover, when u! 0,
q1 is derived from i = h (1) (q1), which should be a nite number. When q ! 0, u
should approach 1. From (22), we have
(26) H 0 (u) = ! (g01   c01)
dq1
du
+ (1  !) (g02   c02)
dq2
du
;
where dq2=du can be derived from (25)
(27)
dq2
du
=
1z }| {
!` (1 + i) (
0
1g1 + 1g
0
1)  (1  !) i01g2
(1  !) i (1g02   02g2   2g02)| {z }
2
dq1
du
:
We can show that 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Substituting (27) into (26), we reach
dq1
du
=
H 02
! (g01   c01) 2 + (1  !) (g02   c02) 1
< 0:
It implies that in the (u; q1) space, (22) is also downward sloping. Moreover, when
u! 0, H (u) approaches innity. It follows that q1 should approach innity as well.
We know that both (10) and (22) are downward sloping in the (u; q) space. In
addition, (22) must be above (10) at u! 0. The intersection of the two curves gives
equilibrium (u; q1). If monetary equilibrium exists and is unique (or we focus on the
equilibrium with the smallest q1), it must be the case that (22) is steeper than (10)
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at the equilibrium allocation. Mathematically, it must be true that
(28)
H 02
! (g01   c01) 2 + (1  !) (g02   c02) 1
<  
0
h1
h01
:
After some algebra, one can nd that (28) exactly implies that D > 0. When D > 0,
one can also show that the numerator in @q2=@` must be positive. We can conclude
that
@q1
@`
> 0;
@q2
@`
> 0; and
@u
@`
< 0:
B Solving the Model with Long-term Government
Bonds
With long-term bonds, we update (4) as
W je (m; bs; b`) = Ie + m (m+ bs) + (m + `)b` + EW
j
e^ (0; 0)(29)
+ max
m^;b^s;b^`
n
 mm^  sb^s   `b^`+
h
hS
j + m+(m^+ b^s) + (m+ + `+)b^`
io
,
where S2 = (q2)   m+(d2 + s)   (m++`+)`, with ` denoting the amount of
long-term bonds used by type-2 households in goods market. For a rm, the expected
trading surplus in the goods market is Sf = ! [m+d1   c(q1)]+(1 !)[m+ (d2 + s)+
(m+ + `+)`   c(q2)]. The government budget constraint becomes
(30) m (M  M ) + sBs + ` (B`  B` ) + T = mBs  + mB`  + u:
In (30), newly issued long-term government bonds ` (B`  B` ) contributes to gov-
ernments revenue and payment incurred by the outstanding long-term bonds mB` 
contributes to governments expenditure.
In the goods market, type-2 households can use any assets. Let (q2; d2; s; `)
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denote the terms of trade in the goods market for type-2 households. The general
bargaining solution is g(q2) = m+ (d2 + s) + (m+ + `+)`, where d2  m^; s  b^s
and `  b^`. When all asset constraints are binding, Kalai bargaining solution gives
g(q2) = m+(m^+ b^s + b^`) = (1  )(q2) + c(q2):
We can then derive the FOC with respect to b^` as given by (18).
In the extended model, the Friedman rule (i = 0) still achieves the e¢ cient alloca-
tion. For i > 0, di¤erent cases of monetary equilibrium exist depending on the values
of (i; s; `). We have the following nine cases for i > 0.
(1) When ` = 0 and 0  s  (1  !) =!, long-term bonds do not exist. Mon-
etary equilibrium is the liquidity trap case in the benchmark model. In this case,
is = i` = 0 .
(2) When ` = 0 and (1  !) =! < s < (1  !) g (q2) = [!g (q1)] where (q1; q2)
are solved from h (u) (q1) = i; h (u) (q2) = 0 and (22), long-term bonds do not
exist. Monetary equilibrium is the scarce bonds case in the benchmark model. In
this case, 0 = i` < is < i.
(3) When ` = 0 and s  (1  !) g (q2) = [!g (q1)] where (q1; q2) are solved from
h (u) (q
1) = i; h (u) (q
2) = 0 and (22), long-term bonds do not exist. Monetary
equilibrium is the plentiful bonds case in the benchmark model. In this case, 0 =
i` < is = i.
(4) When s = 0 and `  (1  !) (1  ) i= [! (1 + i)], short-term bonds do
not exist. The supply of long-term bonds is low and i` = (1  ) i= (1 + i) < i.
Type-2 households are indi¤erent between money and long-term bonds. Monetary
equilibrium resembles the liquidity trap case in the benchmark model.
(5)When s = 0 and (1  !) (1  ) i= [! (1 + i)] < ` < (1  !) ig (q2) = [! (1 + i) g (q1)],
where (q1; q2) are solved from h (u) (q1) = i; h (u) (q2) = 0 and (22), short-term
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bonds do not exist. The equilibrium return of long-term bonds is 0 < (1  ) i= (1 + i) <
i` < i. Monetary equilibrium resembles the scarce bonds case in the benchmark
model, where now only long-term bonds are held by households. In equilibrium,
type-1 households hold money and type-2 households hold long-term government
bonds to trade in the goods market. It follows that g (q2) = (m+ + `+) b^`. We
gather the equilibrium conditions (10), (13), (18), and the market clearing condition
(17) that determine equilibrium (q1; q2; u; s`). Notice that (17) implies that
(31) g
 
q2

=
!` (1 + i`)
(1  !) i` g
 
q1

;
where i` is a function of s` from (16).
(6) When s = 0 and `  (1  !) ig (q2) = [! (1 + i) g (q1)] where (q1; q2) are
solved from h (u) (q1) = i; h (u) (q2) = 0 and (22), short-term bonds do not
exist. The supply of long-term bonds is high enough so that i` = i. Monetary
equilibrium resembles the plentiful bonds case in the benchmark model, where now
only long-term bonds are held by households.
(7) When s > 0; ` > 0 and s +  (1 + i)`= [(1  ) i]  (1  !) =!, both
types of bonds exist. The relative low supply of bonds leads to a low return and
0 = is < i` = (1  ) i= (1 + i) < i. Both bonds have the same return as money.
Type-2 households are indi¤erent between money and bonds. This case is represented
by area 1 in Figure 2.
(8) When s > 0, ` > 0, s +  (1 + i)`= [(1  ) i] > (1  !) =! and s +
 (1 + i)`=i < (1  !) g (q2) = [!g (q1)] where (q1; q2) are solved from h (u) (q1) =
i; h (u) (q
2) = 0 and (22), both types of bonds exist and are valued by households.
The equilibrium returns of the bonds satisfy 0 < is < i` < i. This case is represented
by area 2 in Figure 2. We discuss the implications of changing (s; `) in Proposition
4.
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(9) When s > 0, ` > 0 and s +  (1 + i)`=i  (1  !) g (q2) = [!g (q1)] where
(q1; q2) are solved from h (u) (q1) = i; h (u) (q2) = 0 and (22), both types of
bonds exist and are valued by households. The relative high supply of bonds leads
to a high return and is = i` = i. Type-2 households strictly prefer to hold bonds,
but are indi¤erent between the two types of bonds. Their consumption q2 is q and
consumption of type-1 households q1 solves h (u) (q1) = i.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that is > 0. When (19) is satised, we know that both short-term bonds
and long-term bonds are held by type-2 households. It is easy to verify that i` < i
i¤ is < i. We label this type of equilibrium as scarce bonds equilibrium. When i` <
[(1  ) i+ ( + i) is] = [1 + i+ (1  ) is], long-term bonds are dominated by short-
term bonds in terms of its return. Type-2 households hold only short-term bonds.
This case is the same as the scarce bonds equilibrium in the basic model. When
i` > [(1  ) i+ ( + i) is] = [1 + i+ (1  ) is], short-term bonds are dominated by
long-term bonds in terms of its return. Type-2 households hold only long-term bonds.
This case is the same as the liquidity trap equilibrium discussed above. It follows that
when is > 0, the only equilibrium where both short-term bonds and long-term bonds
are valued features 0 < is < i` < i.
In the scarce bonds equilibrium, (q1; q2; ss; s`; u) are determined by (10), (11), (18),
(22), and (21). We derive (21) using the asset market clearing conditions. Recall that
Bs=M = s and B`=M = `. The asset market clearing conditions imply that
(1  !) b^s
!m^
= s and
(1  !) b^`
!m^
= `:
Together with g (q1) = m+m^ and g (q2) = m+b^s + (m+ + `+) b^`, we can reach
(21). Notice that ss is determined by (11). One can nd s` as a function of (q1; q2; u)
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from (21) and substitute it into (18). Then we have three equations (10), (22) and
i  !` (1 + i) g (q
1)
(1  !) g (q2)  !sg (q1) = h (u)
 
q2

:
to solve for (q1; q2; u).
Taking full derivation against these three equations, we have
@q1
@s
=
!(1  !)0h1g1(g02   c02) (h2   i)
D
' D;
@q2
@s
=  !g1 (h2   i) [h
0
1H
0 + !0h1(g
0
1   c01)]
D
;
@u
@s
=  !(1  !)h
0
1g1(g
0
2   c02) (h2   i)
D
'  D;
@q1
@`
=  !(1  !)(1 + i)
0
h1g1(g
0
2   c02)
D
' D;
@q2
@`
=
!(1 + i)g1[h
0
1H
0 + !0h1(g
0
1   c01)]
D
;
@u
@`
=
!(1  !)(1 + i)h01g1(g02   c02)
D
'  D;
where
D =  h01H 0 (u) fh02 [(1  !) g2   !sg1] + (1  !) h2g02   (1  !) ig02g
  (1  !) h0h012(g02   c02) [(1  !) g2   !sg1]
+ !(1  !)0h1(g02   c02) [sig01 + ` (1 + i) g01   sh2g01]
  !0h1(g01   c01) fh02 [(1  !) g2   !sg1] + (1  !) h2g02   (1  !) ig02g :
It remains to nd the sign of D. We follow the same approach as we used above
to reduce the equation system to two equations. In (21), q2 is a function of (q1; s`).
Recall that s` = i2=1. We can transform (21) to
(32) g
 
q2

=
!g1
1  !

s +
` (1 + i)1
i (1   2)

:
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Now we have two equations (10) and (22) to solve for (q1; u). In (22), we view q2as a
function of q1 implicitly dened in (32), and
dq2
du
=
1z }| {
!sig
0
1 (1   2) + !si01g1 + !` (1 + i)01g1 + !` (1 + i)1g01   (1  !) i01g2
(1  !) ig02 (1   2)  (1  !) i02g2 + !si02g1| {z }
2
dq1
du
:
We can verify that 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. Substitute dq2=du into (26),
dq1
du
=
H 0 (u) 2
! (g01   c01) 2 + (1  !) (g02   c02) 1
< 0:
It implies that in the (u; q1) space, (22) is downward sloping. Moreover, when u! 0,
q1 should approach innity. As before, (10) is also downward sloping in the (u; q1)
space and q1 is nite when u! 0. The intersection of (10) and (22) gives equilibrium
(q1; u). If monetary equilibrium exists and is unique (or we focus on the equilib-
rium with the smallest q1), it must be the case that (22) is steeper than (10) at the
equilibrium allocation. Mathematically,
(33)
H 0 (u) 2
! (g01   c01) 2 + (1  !) (g02   c02) 1
<  
0
h1
h01
:
After some algebra, we can show that (33) exactly implies that D > 0. Again, D > 0
implies that the numerator in @q2=@` is positive. We conclude that
@q1
@s
> 0;
@q2
@s
> 0; and
@u
@s
< 0;
@q1
@`
> 0;
@q2
@`
> 0; and
@u
@`
< 0:
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